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ABSTRACT
Spinoza’s theory of persistence is articulated through the conatus (EIp7) and the ratio of
motion and rest (EIIp13). Section I explores Spinoza’s usage of “motion,” and illustrates that the
conatus is essentially temporal. From this claim and Spinoza’s conception of eternity, the problem
arises. I explain this as a contradiction between Natura naturata and Natura naturans. Section II
features an evaluation of the potential acosmist solution and reveals how it contradicts other
Spinozistic commitments. I construct an alternative solution in Section III. Temporal passage is
not an adequate idea for Spinoza. However, Spinoza considers duration to be a feature of reality
that can be explicated without temporal passage. Similar reasoning can also be applied to motion.
Interpreted in this way, temporal passage is ideal while motion is real. This solves the problem of
motion from eternity without entailing the problems present in the acosmist interpretation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Acosmism, the view that the diversity of individuals such as trees, dogs, people, stars,
tables, etc. is not real, has been the subject of longstanding debate in Spinoza scholarship. The
view arises from a prima facie tension in Spinoza’s works between the apparent plurality of the
world and its underlying unity. Substance is indivisible and unified (EIp15), but this seems
incompatible with plurality, which Spinoza also endorses (EIp11d). The acosmist interpreter
diffuses the tension by denying the actuality of the plurality. Perspectives on this tension fall into
two camps: those who interpret Spinoza as an acosmist or idealist1 about particulars and those who
interpret him as a realist about particulars.2 In this paper, I examine an unexplored instance of this
tension that occurs in Spinoza’s metaphysics of persistence. For Spinoza, persistence of physical
objects is reliant on the ratio of motion and rest between an object’s parts. It is not clear how
Spinoza understands “motion” (motus), so I draw on textual evidence which suggests that time is
a necessary condition for motion. Understood in this way, motion is at odds with other features of
Spinoza’s metaphysics, particularly eternity. He thinks substance exists eternally (EIp8s2), but
asserts that eternity bears no relation whatsoever to time or temporality (EId8e). Since persistence
necessitates motion, and motion necessitates time, it seems that persistence is incompatible with
eternal substance. I call this “the problem of motion from eternity.” I propose a solution that applies

1

There are differences between acosmist and idealist interpretations of Spinoza, but for the purposes of this paper,
they run together. They both lend themselves to Eleatic interpretations of Spinoza, and thus I will treat them as opposed
to realism. “Acosmism” and “idealism” refer to denial of the reality of particulars (either by denying that they are
actual or that they are mind-independent) and “realism” is the endorsement of the reality of particulars.
2
Yitzhak Melamed’s “Acosmism or Weak Individuals?: Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite” features a
survey of some acosmist commentators and provides a general argument in favor of the opposing view.
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idealist thinking to temporal passage while maintaining realist commitments to the existence of
finite modes.
Spinoza’s theory of persistence is articulated through the conatus (EIp7) and its
relationship to the ratio of motion and rest (EIIp13). Section I of this paper explores Spinoza’s
usage of “motion,” and illustrates that the conatus is essentially temporal. From this claim and
Spinoza’s conception of eternity, the problem arises. I explain this as a contradiction between
Natura naturata and Natura naturans. Section II features an evaluation of the potential acosmist
solution and reveals how it contradicts Spinoza’s commitment to parallelism between the attributes
and degrees of reality. Through an interpretation of Spinoza’s epistemology and passages from his
“Letter on the Infinite,” I construct an alternative solution in Section III. Temporal passage is not
an adequate idea for Spinoza, and can thus be understood as ideal. However, Spinoza considers
duration to be a feature of reality that can be explicated without temporal passage. Similar
reasoning can also be applied to motion. Interpreted in this way, temporal passage is ideal while
motion is real. This solves the problem of motion from eternity without entailing the problems
present in the acosmist interpretation.
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II. MOTION AND THE CONATUS
A theory of persistence sets out to explain how any given object maintains its existence. In
the Ethics, Spinoza presents two accounts of persistence. I call these “the conatus account” and
“the ratio account,” and derive their structures from EIIIp6 and the Physical Interlude,
respectively. The demonstration following EIIIp6 explains the metaphysics of persistence:
For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain
and determinate way (by EIp25c), i.e. (by EIp34), things that express, in a certain
and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts. And no thing has
anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away
(by EIIIp4). On the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence
away (by EIIIp5). Therefore, as far as it can, and it lies in itself, it strives to
persevere in its being, Q.E.D. (EIIIp6d).3
Immediately following this passage, Spinoza labels this phenomenon the “conatus” (EIIIp7). Thus,
the conatus account of persistence can most simply be understood as follows: a thing has nothing
in itself by which it can be destroyed and persists in virtue of its status as a mode of an active God,
striving to persevere against external causes.4
The ratio account relies on a different scheme, applying specifically to physical bodies,
and can be found in the Physical Interlude:5

All references to Spinoza’s works are to Edwin Curley’s translations. Curley translates “conatus” as “striving.”
It is not clear exactly what it means for an object to have nothing in itself by which it can be destroyed. Don Garrett’s
“Spinoza’s Conatus Argument” argues that this means none of an object’s essential features (as opposed to accidental
features) can cause its destruction. John Carriero’s “Conatus” maintains that the conatus can be taken as a conditional
statement: if a certain thing leads to an object’s destruction, then that thing was never “in” the object in the first place.
Both of these readings are consistent with the arguments made in this paper.
5
Alison Peterman, in her article, “The ‘Physical’ Interlude,” expresses doubt that Spinoza uses physical concepts qua
physical in the Ethics at all. Peterman asserts that the use of physical concepts in the Ethics is intentionally construed
metaphysically by the author, and thus should not be read as contributing to a greater physics. While I am sympathetic
to this view, I think the definitions of the terms at play (such as “motion”), whether they are construed physically or
metaphysically, have relevant physical consequences. Thus, I will be reading physical terms like motion as physical,
though I do not mean to suggest they should be read as only physical.
3
4
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When a number of bodies, whether of the same or of different size, are so
constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or if they so move,
whether with the same degree or different degrees of speed, that they communicate
their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner, we shall say that those bodies
are united with one another and that they all together compose one body or
Individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies
(EIIp13d).
Spinoza goes on to explain that an object will persist even if its parts are replaced by
others (EIIp13l4), become greater or smaller (EIIp13l5), or change direction and speed (EIIp13l6),
assuming these happen without changing the ratio of motion and rest. This reveals the ratio
account: as long as the parts of a physical object maintain a consistent ratio of motion and rest,
even given substantial change to other variables, the object persists.
Thus, Spinoza lays out two accounts of persistence, one pertaining to things in general and
the other specifically to physical bodies.
The conatus account: a thing persists in virtue of its status as a mode of an active
God, striving to persevere against external causes.
The ratio account: a physical body persists insofar as it maintains a consistent
ratio of motion and rest among its constituent parts.
The conatus is the essence of a thing (EIIIp7). A physical object cannot be conceived separate
from its ratio of motion and rest, so this ratio constitutes its essence (EIId2).6 Thus, the ratio must
constitute the conatus (perhaps in an incomplete sense). The ratio of motion and rest among a
thing’s constituent (physical) parts is an aspect of that thing’s conatus.7 In other words,
maintaining a consistent ratio of motion and rest may be the way a physical object strives to
persevere in its being.

“I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which,
being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived,
and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing” (EIId2).
7
For two different arguments to this conclusion, see “Conatus and Perfection in Spinoza” by John Carriero and
Persistence through Time in Spinoza by Jason Waller. Even Sean Winkler’s “The Conatus of the Body in Spinoza’s
Physics,” which argues that the ratio and conatus are entirely distinct, treats these as intimately connected to one
another.
6
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However, the ratio of motion and rest (and thus the conatus) depends entirely on what
Spinoza means by “motion” (motus). Through examination of Spinoza’s use of the term, I argue
that motion necessarily involves temporality, and thus that persistence in virtue of the conatus
necessarily involves temporality. It is worth mentioning that Spinoza’s contemporaries were
frustrated by the fact that he never properly discussed the nature of motion, even though it plays a
key role in his physics and metaphysics.8 In a letter to Spinoza, von Tschirnhaus directly addresses
this: “If you have the time and the opportunity, I humbly ask you for the true definition of motion
and its explanation…” (Ep. 59). Spinoza, however, declines to answer: “As for the other things,
concerning motion and method, because they aren’t yet written out in an orderly fashion, I reserve
them for another occasion” (Ep. 60). It is strange how Spinoza treats motion, in that it is integral
to his metaphysics and (sparse) physics, but is never explained.9 Present commentators are
therefore left to tease out a definition of motion merely from his use of the term.10 It is outside the
scope of this paper to examine every instance of the word throughout Spinoza’s works, so I will
attend to an illuminating few that are sufficient for the task at hand. These instances are from “On
God’s Immensity” in the Metaphysical Thoughts and from EIIp44s. Given his use of the terms
“slowly”

(tardius),

“quickly”

(celeries),

“speed”

(celeriter),

“time”

(tempus),

and

“move” (moveri), the text suggests Spinoza essentially considers motion to be a change in position
over time.11

8

Eric Schliesser outlines a few of these frustrations, particularly as they apply to More, Clarke, Maclaurin, and Newton
in his paper, “Newton and Spinoza: On Motion and Matter (and God, of Course).”
9
The notable exception is the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. However, given that this work is more
representative of how Spinoza read Descartes than it is of Spinoza himself (and that it is one of Spinoza’s earlier
works), it is unsafe to assume the discussion therein is illuminating about Spinoza’s mature thoughts on motion.
10
Alison Peterman reviews this method for understanding motion in Spinoza briefly in “Spinoza on Extension” and
“Spinoza on Physical Science.”
11
To avoid committing Spinoza to an absolutist conception of space (and therefore motion), it may be best to conceive
of “spaces” as positional orientations relative to other objects. In fact, if Spinoza’s conception of motion follows
Descartes’ in any direct sense, then this type of interpretation is probably more accurate. In the Principles of
Philosophy, Descartes defines motion as “the transfer of one piece of matter or of one body, from the neighborhood

5

It is important to first address an ambiguity in the term itself. “Motion” can refer to two
different things, which John Toland explains well in his criticism of Spinoza’s reliance on the term:
We agree on every side that the perpetual changes in matter are the effects of
motion, which produces an infinity of different figures, mixtures, and sensible
qualities.12 But we must distinguish between local motion and the moving force or
action: for local motion is only a change of situation, or the successive application
of the same body to the respective parts of several other bodies; so that this motion
is nothing different from the body itself, nor any real being in nature, but a mere
mode or consideration of its situation, and the effect of some force or action without
or within its body. 13
Here Toland points out the ambiguity (whether in Spinoza or in general) whereby the term
“motion” refers both to particular instances of motion (local motion) and to the principle by which
motion occurs (moving force or action). Given that an object’s ratio of motion and rest involves a
particular instance of motion (the motion in or of some object rather than motion in general), at
present I am more concerned with local motion, as Toland would call it. However, I will treat with
the underlying principle (the moving force or action) in Section II. On account of the fact that there
is a variety of objects, a variety of ratios of motion and rest is necessary. Because of this, when
Spinoza talks about an object’s ratio of motion and rest (and thus the object’s persistence in virtue
of that ratio), he must be referring to a particularized ratio of motion and rest (otherwise, all things
might have the same ratio and thus could not be individuated). Therefore, as I explicate Spinoza’s
usage of “motion,” I will attempt to articulate his account of particularized motion.

of those bodies immediately contiguous to it and considered at rest, into the neighborhood of others” (Pr II 25). This
definition relativizes motion to the bodies around it, rather to an absolute space – and Spinoza would have certainly
been familiar with this thought.
12
I take Toland’s use of “we” in this sentence to be referring to Toland and Spinoza or to Toland and a Spinozist, as
he claims that his interlocutor is a person who admires Spinoza (though he could be making a more sweeping claim
about philosophers in general). I take this to mean that the remainder of the passage is meant to entertain Spinozistic
thought, rather than Toland’s understanding of motion (though he may agree with the Spinozist). The latter half of
this sentence opens the door to some exploration of how diversity follows from unity in Spinoza, and I will address
this further in Section II.
13
John Toland, Letters to Serena, Letter IV: “To a gentleman in Holland, showing Spinoza’s system of philosophy to
be without any principle of foundation.”
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Spinoza makes an argument in his Metaphysical Thoughts where motion plays an
important role. “If God, they say, is pure act, as indeed he is, he must be everywhere and infinite.
For if he were not everywhere, either he would not be able to be wherever he wishes to be, or he
would necessarily – note this – have to move” (CM II 3). This argument is meant to illustrate that
a given way of thinking about God is incorrect, but this is no reason to think the conception of
motion presented therein is incorrect. The usage of “move” describes a situation wherein an object
occupies a certain area of extended space, but not a different area of extended space. As such, there
are two relevant areas: one area that the object occupies and another that it does not. The transition
of status regarding the unoccupied space is also relevant to motion. The space that is unoccupied
by the object must become occupied by the object. In other words, the orientation of one object
toward other objects must become a different orientation. From Spinoza’s usage of the term here,
it is clear that motion occurs when an object occupying a particular space comes to occupy a
different particular space.14 Put simply, (local) motion is a change in position.
Returning to the Ethics, another feature of motion can be gathered from EIIp44s.
“Moreover, no one doubts but what we also imagine time, viz. from the fact that we imagine some
bodies to move more slowly, or more quickly, or with the same speed” (EIIp44s). These notions
of quickness and slowness are particularly revealing. Quickness and slowness necessarily involve
speed, which is confirmed by Spinoza’s presentation of “at the same speed” in opposition to these
terms. If each body moves with a certain speed (EIIp13a2), then motion must occur at a certain
speed. Speed can only be measured by the amount of time it takes an object to travel a certain
distance. The conclusion from this is direct: if motion necessitates speed and speed necessitates
temporality, then motion must necessitate temporality. This, coupled with the passage from the

14

Or when an object’s position relative to others comes to be a different position relative to others.
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Metaphysical Thoughts, fleshes out the concept of motion in Spinoza. This may not be an
exhaustive or complete definition, but the text suggests that whenever Spinoza says “motion,” he
is referring to an object’s change in position over time. From EIIp44s, it is clear that Spinoza thinks
we perceive time as passing – we see that objects move more slowly or more quickly by
recognizing a change over consecutive, sequential moments. Thus, I take “time” here to mean
temporal passage.
It should be noted here that Spinoza disparages appeals to the imagination when reasoning
about the world, and instead prefers appeals to the intellect. These refer to aspects of Spinoza’s
epistemology and are discussed in the appendix to Part I of the Ethics. “For when things are so
disposed that, when they are presented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine
them...” (EIApp). This ties the imagination to perception. For Spinoza, all knowledge obtained
through the senses is apprehended by the imagination, while all knowledge obtained through
reason is apprehended by the intellect. From the appendix to Part I, it is clear that the intellect
provides reliable knowledge and the imagination does not: “And because those who do not
understand the nature of things, but only imagine them, affirm nothing concerning things, and take
the imagination for the intellect, they firmly believe, in their ignorance of things and of their own
nature, that there is an order in things” (EIApp). Spinoza thinks the imagination provides
information only about things as they affect the senses, while the intellect apprehends things as
they are in themselves. This will be an important distinction moving forward and I will return to it
in greater detail.
What is important to recognize here is that this discussion of motion and persistence criteria
relies solely on the intellect and makes no appeals to the imagination. Although Spinoza mentions
sense-data in EIIp44s, the connection between speed and time as temporal passage (and therefore

8

between motion and temporal passage) is established a priori. I will discuss the relation of time to
the imagination in due course. For now, I turn to the involvement of temporal passage in motion
(and persistence in virtue of the conatus) and the problem arising therefrom.

9

III. THE PROBLEM OF MOTION FROM ETERNITY AND THE ACOSMIST SOLUTION
It appears Spinoza’s theory of persistence relies heavily on the notion of temporal
passage.15 However, when measured against other commitments made throughout the Ethics, this
may be an untenable position. To illustrate why, there are two terms that must be addressed: “time”
(tempus) and “eternity” (aeternitatem). With reference to Spinoza’s usage of these two terms and
in light of the apparent association of motion with temporal passage, I demonstrate that persistence
is impossible in Spinoza’s philosophy, by his own lights.
Eternity is one of the first terms defined in the Ethics: “By eternity I understand existence
itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal
thing” (EId8). Spinoza continues later in Part I, saying that “in eternity, there is neither when, nor
before, nor after” (EIp33s2) and in Part V that “eternity can neither be defined by time nor have
any relation to time” (EVp23s). These definitions make an important point: eternity is tenseless. If
an object exists in the past, it exists tenselessly from eternity, as does an object in the present or
the future. All time is ontologically similar in relation to eternity – that is, all things, past, present,
or future, occupy the same ontological category, and thus there is no temporal passage understood
from eternity.
This separation of temporal passage and eternity is clear in Spinoza’s dichotomous
approach to God. From Part I: “…by Natura naturans we must understand what is in itself and is
conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence”

15

Additionally, since Spinoza insists that individuation happens due to the ratio of motion and rest (EIIp13l1), his
theory of individuation relies on temporality as well.
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(EIp29s) and “by Natura naturata I understand whatever follows from the necessity of God’s
nature, or from any of God’s attributes, i.e., all the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are
considered as things which are in God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God” (EIp29s).
These concepts as relevant to this discussion are:
Natura naturans: Nature from eternity (Nature in, of, and through itself).
Natura naturata: Nature as modes, which (insofar as they are considered in
extension) exist in spatiotemporal relations to one another.16
Because Natura naturans is substance understood as eternal and Natura naturata allows substance
to be understood as spatiotemporal modes, a problem arises from this distinction: Natura naturata
allows for the conatus as temporal and Natura naturans does not. This means that Spinoza’s
persistence theory is consistent with Natura naturata, but not Natura naturans. The very existence
of a perspective from eternity casts doubt on the notion that things can persist at all. Persistence in
virtue of the conatus necessarily involves temporal passage – thus, if there is no temporal passage,
then there is no persistence. From the fact that Natura naturata allows for time and Natura
naturans does not, reality must be fundamentally different from these two perspectives. From one
(Natura naturata), things temporally persist. From the other (Natura naturans), nothing can persist
at all. This is the problem of motion from eternity.
Since this problem arises from the persistence of modes, simply denying the existence of
modes might be attractive, yet radical. Many have interpreted Spinoza as believing the plurality of
the world is nonexistent (acosmism).17 Although this reading is compelling in light of the problem
discussed thus far, it is ultimately mistaken. The problem boils down to a simple contradiction:

16

Natura naturata involves spatiotemporal relations due to the fact that modes in extension exhibit a ratio of motion
and rest, and the definition of motion I have established involves both space and time.
17
See Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy for an early interpretation and Michael Della Rocca’s
“Rationalism, Idealism, Monism, and Beyond” for a more recent interpretation.
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persistence is both possible and impossible in Spinoza’s philosophy, depending on perspective. To
overcome this contradiction, either the perspective associated with Natura naturata must be
affirmed while the perspective associated with Natura naturans is denied, or vice versa. To deny
the perspective associated with Natura naturans would be to deny the eternality and indivisibility
of substance. This is certainly not a fair interpretation of Spinoza, as he is very explicit in the
beginning of the Ethics that substance is absolutely unified and indivisible. Additionally, Spinoza’s
use of the phrase “sub specie aeternitatis” becomes confused, as this refers to a perspective from
eternity, which is impossible if Nature is only Natura naturata.
Denying Natura naturata holds more promise, and I take this to be the acosmist approach.
If understanding anything through the modes is understanding Nature as Natura naturata, then
denying Natura naturata is to deny the reality of the modes. This solves the problem of motion
from eternity by denying that motion actually happens. If no modes exist, there is nothing with a
ratio of motion and rest or a conatus. Persistence of modes depends on motion, but motion is
impossible from eternity – therefore, modes do not persist (and I take this to be a weaker version
of the claim that modes do not exist).
This solution is elegant in its simplicity and solves some enduring issues in Spinoza. For
instance, acosmism puts to rest the tension between Spinoza’s apparent commitment to Nature’s
plurality and his commitment to Nature’s unity by denying the former. Additionally, acosmism
makes sense of the claim that Spinoza makes at EId4: that attributes are conceptually tied to the
intellect. If attributes are tied to the intellect, then it seems thought has priority over the other
attributes. This lends itself to the notion that all attributes reduce to thought and are thus ideal.
Finally, acosmism helps make sense of Spinoza’s adamant commitment to the Principle of
Sufficient Reason (EIa2 and EIa3). So, it seems that there is quite a bit of extraneous motivation

12

for accepting the acosmist solution.18 However, there is some reason to believe that Spinoza
himself would have rejected it. In his paper, “Why Spinoza is not an Eleatic Monist (Or Why
Diversity Exists),” Yitzhak Melamed provides six textual arguments against the acosmist
interpretation of Spinoza. While all of what he presents on this issue is persuasive, I will only here
reconstruct two of his arguments.
Melamed invokes the parallelism doctrine. Spinoza says that “the thinking substance and
the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this
attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the
same thing, but expressed in two ways” (EIIp7s). Whatever there is in extension there must also
be in thought, and vice versa. Melamed thinks that this parallelism cannot be made sense of on the
acosmist reading. The parallelism doctrine outright contradicts acosmism “insofar as it clearly
asserts the existence of a plurality of entities.”19 If Spinoza did not believe in the existence of
modes, he would not have had any reason to write about the “order” among modes being congruent
across attributes. Not only would this be irrelevant and unnecessary, but it would be outright false
to claim that any such order exists.
Another of Melamed’s arguments stems from Spinoza’s commitment to the view that
reality exists in degrees. Spinoza says that “it is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one
substance. Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some
attribute, and the more reality, or being it has, the more it has attributes which express necessity,
or eternity, and infinity” (EIp10s). This is closely followed by: “since the divine nature has
absolutely infinite attributes, each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from

18

Samuel Newlands goes over some of the reasons acosmism has been a historically popular interpretation of Spinoza
(at least from the 19th century until now) in his paper, “More Recent Idealist Readings of Spinoza.”
19
Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Why Spinoza is Not an Eleatic Monist (Or Why Diversity Exists).”
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its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite modes” (EIp16d). From these two
statements, God is real and has properties. According to Melamed, this “provides some motivation
for the existence of modes,” because the modes are these properties.20 Acosmism does not allow
for that which follows necessarily from God’s essence to exist, and thus should be rejected.
There still remains a problem: Melamed’s arguments may illustrate that acosmism is not
compatible with other aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy, but it is entirely possible that some of
Spinoza’s commitments might entail theses he never considered. In other words, Spinoza might
have stumbled into acosmism, whether he wanted to or not. In order to save him from this mistake,
it is not enough to show that acosmism clashes with certain of Spinoza’s commitments. What is
required is to explain how Spinoza’s claims can be clarified such that they do not imply acosmism.
To that end, I refer again to a statement from John Toland: “We agree on every side that the
perpetual changes in matter are the effects of motion, which produces an infinity of different
figures, mixtures, and sensible qualities.”21 Here Toland explicates and agrees with a Spinozistic
principle. The variety of things – that is, the differences in shape, color, hardness, heat, smell, etc.
of objects (the things that differentiate them from one another) – is the effect of motion. Motion is
what gives rise to the plurality of objects. How might this be?
Section I of this paper included an interpretive account of particularized (or “local”)
motion. Here, it is necessary to discuss the motive force – the underlying commonality shared by
all instances of particularized motion. It is difficult to differentiate between the different uses of
“motion” in Spinoza, but there is a certain context in which it is clear that Spinoza refers to the
generalized motive force, rather than local motion. This is in his discussion of infinite modes.
Though he invokes the notion of infinite modes slightly earlier in the Ethics, Spinoza’s clearest

20
21

Ibid., 213.
Toland, Letters to Serena, Letter IV.
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statement on them in the work is at EIp28s: “…certain things had to be produced by God
immediately, viz. those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature, and others, (which
nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God) had to be produced by the mediation
of those first things…” (EIp28s). Coupled with EIp22 and EIp23, it is clear that Spinoza is here
establishing the order of modes as they follow from substance. All of the finite things in the
universe follow from a necessarily infinite (EIp22 and EIp23) mode which is necessarily entailed
by the essence of substance. Unfortunately, Spinoza does not offer any explanation about what
these infinite modes might be. All we know from this passage is that the most fundamental thing
in existence is substance, which necessitates the existence of some infinite mode, and it is from
this infinite mode that finite things follow.
The Ethics does not provide any specifics about this transition from infinite substance to
finite modes – but Spinoza’s contemporaries were clever enough to ask. In a letter to Schuller,
Spinoza responds to questions about these infinite modes. Schuller asks what the immediate
infinite mode (the mode that follows directly from the nature of God) is, and also asks for an
example of the particular modes (the mediate infinite modes, as they would later be called) which
follow from the immediate infinite mode. Spinoza responds:
...the examples [of infinite modes] you ask for: examples of the first kind [i.e., of
things produced immediately by God] are, in Thought, absolutely infinite intellect,
and in Extension, motion and rest; an example of the second kind [i.e., of those
produced by the mediation of some infinite modification] is the face of the whole
universe, which, however much it may vary in infinite ways, nevertheless always
remains the same (Ep. 64).
According to this letter, Spinoza thinks that “motion and rest” is an immediate infinite mode and
that the face of the whole universe (which I take to mean the totality of all modes under a given
attribute; constituted by finite modes) is a mediate infinite mode. Thus, motion and rest follow
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necessarily from the essence of God, and it is motion and rest (where motion is motive force) that
causes the existence of the face of the whole universe.
This explains the metaphysical mechanics behind Spinoza’s insistence that the modes
follow necessarily from the essence of substance, or rather how the plurality and diversity of things
can follow necessarily from the unified nature of substance. Extension follows necessarily from
substance – as the attributes of God are essential to his nature (EIp4d) – and it appears that a
necessary feature of this attribute is motion (motive force). Given that Spinoza thinks extension
without body is incoherent, it seems he has built into his system all that is necessary for plurality.
Motion and rest in extension is motion and rest of bodies (motive force), and thus bodies can be
differentiated from one another in respect of motion and rest (local motion) (EIIp13L1’). I take
this to be sufficient as an explanation for the existence of plurality in Spinoza’s metaphysics, at
least generally.22 Though Spinoza may still have issues to face (possibly other motivations for the
acosmist interpretation), I think these passages illustrate that he maintains the necessary conceptual
tools to derive plurality from his unified substance.
Melamed’s arguments, in conjunction with this interpretation of the infinite modes of
extension, suggest acosmism is an unacceptable solution to the problem of motion from eternity.23
A different solution is therefore preferable. To that end, I look to Spinoza’s discussions of the
imagination, given its role in the perception of temporal passage. To outline this solution, I
examine some of Spinoza’s discussion of time and duration and outline the relationships between
perception, imagination, and adequate ideas. After building a solution from these notions, I discuss

I follow and agree with the arguments made by Noa Shein in her paper “Not Wholly Finite: The Dual Aspect of
Finite Modes in Spinoza,” Tad Schmaltz in his paper “Spinoza’s Mediate Infinite Mode,” and Federica De Felice in
her paper “On Causation and Infinitive Modes in Spinoza’s Philosophical System,” which all rely on the general
notion that plurality follows from God through the mediation of motion and rest.
23
If the case built here is wanting, Melamed offers four other arguments in the same paper. Additionally, Steven
Nadler’s “Spinoza’s Monism and the Reality of the Finite” makes a convincing argument for similar conclusions.
22
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whether or not it is satisfactory and suggest some potential difficulties. Ultimately, I assert that
this solution is more consistent than the acosmist reading, despite these potential problems.
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IV. TIME AS AN INADEQUATE IDEA
To lay groundwork for the solution, it is important to delve into what Spinoza means by
“imagine” (imaginari and cognates). Recall that by “imagine” Spinoza means something like
perception, insofar as perception is the activity the mind engages in when it organizes data from
sensory organs. “…[T]he affections of the human Body whose ideas present external bodies as
present to us, we shall call images of things, even if they do not reproduce the figures of things.
And when the Mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines” (EIIp17s). Moreover,
Spinoza thinks the imagination cannot err unless one considers perceived things to be real things:
And here, in order to begin to indicate what error is, I should like you to note that
the imaginations of the Mind, considered in themselves contain no error, or that the
Mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered
to lack an idea that excludes the existence of those things that it imagines to be
present to it. For if the Mind, while it imagined nonexistent things as present to it,
at the same time knew that those things did not exist, it would, of course, attribute
this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature… (EIIp17s).
When one understands that imaginings are not representative of the world in itself, one can
overcome the error and understand that imagination is related to the nature of the body.
However, this does not mean things deduced from the imagination are reliable. Spinoza
makes a clear distinction in his epistemology which exemplifies the superiority of adequate ideas
that do not involve the imagination over inadequate ideas that do. In Ethics Part II, Spinoza says
that an adequate idea is “an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an
object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea” (EIId4). Daisie Radner
offers some clarification which illustrates that ideas deduced from the senses are not ideas of
objects themselves, but instead are ideas of the body affected by objects. “All that the mind
18

perceives it perceives by means of the ideas of the affections of its own body. For example, when
the mind perceives the sun, the idea by means of which it perceives the sun is the idea of the body
as affected by the sun... Thus it has inadequate ideas of these things.”24 All ideas obtained through
the imagination must be inadequate. Radner goes on to say that “[t]he things of which the mind
has adequate knowledge or ideas include that which is common to all bodies and ‘the eternal and
infinite essence of God.’”25 These are the ideas related to the intellect (intellectus), rather than the
imagination. Ideas associated with the intellect are obtained through reason alone. Furthermore, it
is clear from the appendix to Part 1 of the Ethics that Spinoza thinks ideas obtained by the intellect
are vastly more valuable than those obtained by the imagination. An adequate idea is an idea
without relation to an object’s affections on the body (apprehended through the intellect) (EIId4),
while an inadequate idea is an idea of an object’s affections on the body (apprehended through the
imagination). It can be deduced from this system that any idea involving perception at its
conception is not an adequate idea.
Spinoza says explicitly that time is imagined: “…no one doubts but what we also imagine
time…” (EIIp44s). Moreover, he is clear that our conception of time arises from specific types of
things that we perceive: “…from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly, or
more quickly, or with the same speed” (EIIp44s). With reference to successive change here
(speed), it seems that he is referring to temporal passage. For temporal passage to be an adequate
idea, it would have to be derived without reference to affections of the body. However, since
Spinoza thinks the idea of temporal passage arises from perceptions of objects moving at different
speeds, he must affirm that temporal passage is related to the affections of the body. Thus, Spinoza

24
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Daisie Radner, “Spinoza’s Theory of Ideas.”
Ibid., 339.
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can be read as claiming temporal passage is not a real feature of the world, as it only arises when
the world is understood inadequately.
This leads to odd consequences and has a significant effect on how motion should be
understood. If this is truly the case, there are features of extension that must be reconsidered,
namely duration and dimensionality. Even if temporal passage is ideal (this interpretation seems
to suggest such an ideality, if not require it), Spinoza still uses language throughout the Ethics that
treats “duration” (duratio) as something entirely its own – related to temporal passage but not itself
temporal by necessity. In Part I, when offering his definition for eternity, Spinoza implicitly
differentiates time and duration: “For such existence, like the essence of a thing, is conceived as
an eternal truth, and on that account cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration
is conceived to be without beginning or end” (EId8e). Spinoza writes “time or duration,” using the
exclusive “or” (aut), rather than the inclusive (sive). This suggests a conceptual distinction:
duration and time are fundamentally disparate notions for Spinoza. This means that, though
temporal passage is not a real feature of the world, duration could be. Motion may also be best
understood similarly.
Duration is defined in the Ethics as “an indefinite continuation of existing” (EIId5) and is
later equated with existence as such (EIIp45s). While “continuation” (continuatio) might have
temporal connotation, duration is never explicitly linked to temporal passage. This is further
complicated when Spinoza explicates why adequate knowledge of the duration of the body is
impossible.
Our body’s duration depends neither on its essence, nor even on God’s absolute
nature. But it is determined to exist and produce an effect from such causes as are
also determined by others to exist and produce an effect in a certain and determinate
manner, and these again by others, and so to infinity. Therefore, the duration of our
Body depends on the common order of nature and the constitution of
things (EIIp30d).
20

This explains that an object’s duration cannot be derived from its essence, but can rather only be
understood through the relations it holds to other objects (this is consistent with the conatus, as an
object cannot come to destruction by any internal features). Spinoza goes on to say that, while it
is impossible regarding the body, it is possible to have adequate knowledge of the duration of other
objects. It seems clear, then, that duration is a real aspect of the world. But if duration (an adequate
idea) cannot be understood through temporal passage (the involvement of which necessarily entails
inadequacy), how should duration be understood?
Perhaps we make sense of objects and their durations relative to one another by organizing
them according to our perceptions, and the organizational tool is temporal passage. In fact, Spinoza
is relatively explicit about this in his “Letter on the Infinite” to Lodewijk Meyer. Spinoza explains
that “Measure” and “Time” are aids to the imagination for making sense of “Quantity” and
“Duration.” “Next, from the fact that when we conceive Quantity abstracted from Substance and
separate Duration from the way it flows from eternal things, we can determine them as we please,
there arise Time and Measure – Time to determine Duration and Measure to determine Quantity
in such a way that, so far as possible, we imagine them easily” (Ep. 12). Spinoza thinks time is a
tool for making sense of what is real (in the same way that measure is not real, but represents
quantity).26
Spinoza is usually taken to think that objects are extended in length, width, and
height.27 However, given this understanding of time and the way Spinoza talks about duration,
duration is also a basic feature of extended modes. Potentially, extension can be understood

26

I take Spinoza here to be treating temporal passage as a feature of time in general. Otherwise, this account makes
little sense. Time only helps make sense of objects’ relations to one another if it is taken as changing from moment
to moment. See the thought experiment at EIIp44s, which I discuss further in footnote 30.
27
Waller, 83-96.

21

four-dimensionally: length, width, height, duration.28 Be that as it may, the essential takeaway is
that Spinoza suggests time is ideal, but that duration (a notion generally associated with time) is
real.
What does all of this mean for the problem of motion from eternity? My solution requires
one final step. There are two ways of interpreting the concepts from the “Letter on the Infinite”
(measure, quantity, time, duration, and motion). First, Spinoza can be read as thinking that motion
belongs in the same category as measure and temporal passage. Measure and temporal passage are
inadequate ideas which assist in ordering real aspects of the world (quantity and duration). On this
reading, motion is also an inadequate idea which fulfills a similar role, such as organizing causal
relationships between bodies. However, this way of reading Spinoza lends itself to acosmism:
motion is required for persistence, but if motion is taken in the same way as measure and temporal
passage, then persistence must be denied. The foregoing discussion of acosmism illustrates why
this is unacceptable.
The second reading of the passage from the “Letter on the Infinite” is more palatable.
Temporal passage is not real but is a tool for making sense of what is real. Just as duration is
ontologically prior to the passage of time, the same can be said for motion. Instead of grouping
motion with measure and temporal passage, it should be grouped with quantity and duration. On
this reading, quantity, duration, and motion all exist, but the inadequate ideas through which they
are understood are ideal (measure and time). As Spinoza says, time and measure are aids to the
imagination, making it easier to organize data from the affections of the body. It is, however,
unclear what the world is like without reference to ideas from the imagination. Perhaps common

This might also introduce another theory of persistence for Spinoza – that is, a four-dimensional theory of
persistence. Objects persist because they are extended through the medium over which they persist, in addition to their
height, length, and width. Of course, I do not want to commit Spinoza to a view using a metaphysical toolbox that he
would not have had access to (as Spinoza predates four-dimensionalism by roughly 300 years).
28
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temporal structures can be replaced by logical or causal structures. In this interpretation,
temporality is given up in favor of something more basic. If the essential structure of reality can
be fully explained without temporal passage (and the explanation of temporal passage as an
inadequate idea holds), then it would seem prudent not to complicate the picture unnecessarily.
However, if temporal passage is an inadequate idea, then it would seem likely that there is a real
thing or an adequate idea which the inadequate idea aims to apprehend. In other words, what is the
real feature of reality that the inadequate idea most captures?
There are surely many possible answers to this question, but here I will only suggest two.
First, there have been some commentators who think Spinoza’s Ethics is oddly ambivalent toward
time,29 so maybe he would have been happier to supplant all of its explanatory power and transfer
that power to something like a pure causal nexus. Rather than engaging with the notion that certain
things precede or follow others in transitional sequence, perhaps Spinoza would more gladly
suggest that certain things simply cause or affect other things. Temporal passage might merely be
a way of managing that nexus, insofar as it relates to perception.30 Another possibility, briefly
mentioned above, is that objects are arranged into a four-dimensionally extended space.31 In this
scenario, the inadequate idea (time) is the result of an attempt to make sense of a dimension of
spatiotemporal extension (duration) that is not as readily accessible as the others. So instead of a
causal structure, temporal passage makes sense of a spatiotemporal structure. It is unclear if either
of these two possibilities (or another undiscussed explanation) captures the feature of the world
that temporal passage inadequately addresses, but a closer examination of textual evidence might
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Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.
Spinoza introduces a thought experiment at EIIp44s which makes time look like a logical construction. This may
remind one of McTaggart, in that there seem to be two ways of understanding time. In the thought experiment, time
seems like a B-series until incompatible circumstances obtain, and thus time must be imagined as an A-series.
31
Eric T. Olson, “Temporal Parts,” In What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology.
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provide an answer. However, before this discussion can take place, temporal passage must be
understood as an inadequate idea in Spinoza, which I have argued for here. This seems to solve
the problem of motion from eternity without sacrificing basic Spinozistic principles which are
thrown to the wayside by acosmism.
If motion is understood similarly to duration – that is, as a real feature of the world – while
temporal passage is understood as ideal, then the problem never arises. The problem is that time,
understood as involving temporal passage from the fact that imaginations of time involve temporal
passage, is necessary for persistence (because time is necessary for motion) and therefore
persistence is not possible from eternity. However, if the idea that motion depends on temporal
passage comes from an inadequate understanding of the world wherein temporal passage is
considered to be a fundamental aspect of reality, then it seems there is no problem at all. This is a
psychological issue rather than a metaphysical one. It is not that motion cannot exist without
temporal passage, but rather that we may be incapable of understanding how motion can exist
without temporal passage. If motion is taken as an aspect of reality, while temporal passage is
taken as ideal, then the problem is entirely dissolved. So a more precise definition for motion in
Spinoza would be: a change in position which we are only capable of understanding as happening
across the passage of time. However, while this is a successful solution, it comes with some hefty
baggage. These issues are not of great enough strength to warrant total denial, but they might raise
a few eyebrows.
The biggest issue is that this might come across as quasi-Kantian. There is good evidence
to suggest that Kant thought of space and time (as we experience them) as mind-dependent
concepts, and it is clear that Kant thought time (as we experience it) existed only in the realm of
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phenomena.32 This interpretation is similar in that, for Spinoza, temporal passage exists only as a
product of the imagination and certainly cannot be made sense of if Nature is understood as Natura
naturans. While there are some implicit connections between Kant’s phenomena/noumena
distinction and Spinoza’s Natura naturata/Natura naturans distinction, the solution here presented
may treat these distinctions too similarly. Kant probably would not have been terribly comfortable
knowing he might be interpreted in the same way as Spinoza,33 and thus this interpretation may be
limited. This is not necessarily a problem, but interpreting Spinoza as a Kantian in any sense (or
vice versa) should give one pause, at the very least.
Additionally, the set of unanswered questions that this solution generates might be
bothersome. What does this mean for the attribute of extension? Should it be understood as threedimensional or four-dimensional? If three-dimensional, how do we make sense of duration? If
four-dimensional, how do we make sense of the persistence conditions presented by Spinoza? Is
motion meant to be understood as a basic feature of extension itself or is it possible to conceive of
extension without conceiving of motion? Can duration be conceived without extension, and vice
versa? Can this solution be reconciled with recent theories about space-time? Knowing that we do
not currently have an adequate idea of motion, is an adequate idea of it even possible? These are
all questions with answers beyond the scope of this paper, but which must necessarily be asked if
the solution here presented is employed.

See the Metaphysical Exposition of Space and Time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
Omri Boehm’s work on this topic provides an interesting reconstruction of the often-ignored relationship between
Kant and Spinoza.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite these issues, this solution is less problematic than acosmism. The acosmist solution
requires an outright denial of certain of Spinoza’s claims from the Ethics (namely EIp10s, EIp16d,
and EIIp7), while the solution presented in this paper requires only a reinterpretation of certain
concepts (namely, time and motion). Because of this, there seems to be little reason to prefer the
acosmist solution over my alternative. Instead, while it might require some flexibility, the solution
which involves denying temporal passage is certainly more successful in the interest of saving
Spinoza from the problem without denying his philosophy. This problem arises initially from the
fact that the persistence theory that Spinoza presents in the Ethics is dependent on time, if time is
taken to involve temporal passage. This is because an object persists in virtue of its conatus, of
which its ratio of motion and rest is a fundamental aspect. Speed is involved in the essence of
motion, and temporal passage seems to be involved in the essence of speed. Thus, it seems that the
conatus account and the ratio account of persistence rely on time understood as temporal passage.
This is problematic because eternity cannot be related to temporal passage whatsoever.
Considering that Spinoza’s dual-conception of Nature includes a perspective from eternity (Natura
naturans), it seems that two incompatible pictures arise. If temporal passage is understood as ideal,
the problem can be resolved.
However, in denying temporal passage, motion must still be possible. In order for this to
be the case, adequate ideas must be invoked: motion and duration are fundamental aspects of the
world of modes (specifically of the attribute of extension) and are prior to temporal passage.
Temporal passage only arises as a way that the imagination orders the data presented to it by the
26

affections of the body. Thus, it seems that motion is possible from eternity, insofar as motion is
uninvolved with temporal passage in the same sense that duration and eternity are uninvolved with
time. By solving the problem this way, the perspectives of Natura naturata and Natura naturans
are maintained, while the discrepancy between eternity and motion is reconciled in Spinozistic
terms. The conclusions, while somewhat odd, lead to a picture where temporal passage is ideal for
Spinoza, but motion and duration are parts of reality. Therefore, persistence remains possible in
the Spinozistic picture.
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